Current Circuit Splits
The following pages contain brief summaries of circuit splits
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between January
31, 2015 and September 2, 2015. This collection, written by the members
of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized into civil and criminal
matters, and then by subject matter and court.
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split, and is
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a
comprehensive analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point.
Preferred citation for the summaries below: Circuit Splits, 12 SETON
HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2015).
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CIVIL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Medicare Civil Penalty – Nursing Home Deficiency Reviewability:
Plott Nursing Home v. Burwell, 779 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2015)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether an Administrative Law judge’s
decision on an appeal of the civil penalties imposed on a nursing home for
deficiencies must also review those deficiencies that “are not material to
the outcome of the appeal.” Id. at 986 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court noted that the 6th Circuit determined that in the interest of
judicial economy, a judge may “choose to address only those deficiencies
that have a material impact on the outcome of the dispute.” Id. at 989
(internal quotation marks omitted). Oppositely, the 8th Circuit found that
due to the possibility of private litigation based on unreviewed
deficiencies, “all the adverse findings appealed should be either upheld or
reversed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The 9th Circuit agreed
with the 8th Circuit that all deficiencies “must be reviewed or dismissed”
due to the possibility of increased penalties in the future based on
unreviewed deficiencies. Id. at 988.
Statute of Limitations Individuals with Disabilities Act – Attorneys’
Fees: Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. D. A., 792 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir.
2015)
The 9th Circuit addressed the timeliness of suits to recover attorney’s
fees that are filed subsequent to an administrative dispute. Id. at 1061–62.
Specifically, the Court addressed which statute of limitations was
applicable to suits brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Act
(IDEA). Id. The Court noted the 6th and 7th Circuits “have characterized
attorney’s fees requests as ancillary to the dispute and have accordingly
borrowed state statutes of limitations for judicial review of administrative
agency decision.” Id. at 1063. Alternatively, the Court noted the
11th Circuit “characterized an attorneys’ fee claim . . . as an independent
action” and applied the state’s standard statute of limitations. Id. The
Court, relying on past precedent and deferring to the trial court, reasoned
that a request for attorney’s fees is more akin to an independent claim
rather than an ancillary proceeding. Id. The Court further supported this
distinction by highlighting that an agency’s “hearing officer” may not
award attorney’s fees. Id. Thus, the 9th Circuit joined the 6th and
7th Circuits in holding that a claim for attorney’s fees under the IDEA is
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separate from the initial action filed and thus the statute does not begin to
run until the suit for attorneys’ fees is brought. Id.
BANKING LAW
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) Rescission Process – Attempt to
Unilaterally Rescind Outside of TILA’s Three-day Period: Sanders v.
Mt. Am. Credit Union, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12811 (10th Cir. July 24,
2015)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether unilateral notification of
cancellation automatically voids the loan contract or the security interest
under TILA. Id. at *12. The court noted that the majority of circuits,
including the 1st and 7th Circuits, have concluded that the borrower cannot
unilaterally rescind their own obligations without also making their lender
whole through tender; therefore, the borrower is unable to automatically
void the security interest by tendering notice of rescission. Id. In contrast,
the 11th Circuit concluded that “rescission is ‘automatic,’ but . . . voiding
of a security interest may be judicially conditioned on borrower’s tender
of amount due.” Id. *12–13. The 10th Circuit agreed with the majority of
circuits, holding that a loan contract is not automatically void by a
unilateral notification of cancellation, at least where “the consumer
provides notice of an intent to rescind outside of TILA’s three-day period.
Id. at *13.
BANKRUPTCY LAW
11 U.S.C.S. § 105 – Authority of Bankruptcy Court to Use Equitable
Powers: SE Prop.Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Eng’g & Surveying (In re
Seaside Eng’g & Surveying), 780 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015)
The 11th Circuit addressed “whether a bankruptcy court has the
authority to issue a non-debtor release and enjoin a non-consenting party
who has participated fully in the bankruptcy proceedings but who has
objected to the non-debtor release barring it from making claims against
the non-debtor that would undermine the operations of the reorganized
entity.” Id. at 1077. The court noted the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th Circuits
have all held that non-debtor releases and injunctions are “permissible.”
Id. The 5th, 9th and 10th Circuits have declined to allow releases of
injunctions against non-debtors. Id. at 1077. The 11th Circuit agreed with
the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 7th Circuits because 11 U.S.C.S. § 105 codifies
that bankruptcy courts apply equitable principles. Id at 1078. Therefore,
the 11th Circuit held bankruptcy courts, utilizing their equitable power,
may release non-debtors and enjoin non-consenting parties. Id.
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Garnishment of Disability Insurance – Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act: United States v. France, 782 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2015)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether a dentist’s disability insurance
benefits were exempt from garnishment under the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 3613 and the Consumer Credit Protection
Act. Id. at 821. The court noted that the 8th Circuit determined that private
disability insurance policies constitute earnings and should be protected.
However, the 7th Circuit found that a defendant forfeited this protection
where the defendant did not “assert it when first delivered with the citation
for discovery of assets.” Id. at 823. The court disagreed with the 8th
Circuit because it “did not address interpretation of the list of exemptions
in § 3613(a) and, in fact, failed to even cite that provision.” Id. at 825.
The 7th Circuit stated, “[t]his oversight is critical . . . because in drafting
§3613, Congress deliberately included and excluded various kinds of
disability income, and the exclusion of private disability cannot be
considered an accident or oversight that should be judicially corrected.”
Id. Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded that the government is allowed to
garnish from a disability insurance policy to fulfill restitution. Id. at 821.
Pension Funds –Trust Fund Contributions: Bos v. Bd. of Trs., 795
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2015)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether they should recognize an
exception to the Cline rule when determining whether or not unpaid
contributions by employers to employee benefit funds are plan assets. Id.
at 1009. The Court noted that the 11th and the 2nd Circuits determined
that documents designating plan assets to include unpaid contributions as
establishing fiduciary status for an employer who had authority to make
such contributions, while the 10th and 6th Circuits found that an employer
cannot be an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”)
fiduciary with respect to unpaid contributions. Id. The 9th Circuit agreed
with the 6th and 10th Circuits in finding that an employer never has
sufficient control over a plan asset to make it a fiduciary for purposes of
§ 523(a)(4). Id. Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded that an employer’s owner
was not a fiduciary under ERISA or 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(4) with respect
to unpaid contributions to employee benefit funds, and the amount owed
therefore could not be held nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Id.
Religious Freedom – Compelling Interest: Listecki v. Official Comm.
Of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d (7th Cir. 2015)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether the Bankruptcy Code (“the
Code”) constitutes a compelling governmental interest under the Free
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Exercise Clause. Id. at 745. The court noted that the 8th Circuit found
that in general the code does not represent a compelling governmental
interest stating, “bankruptcy is not comparable to national security or
public safety.” Id. at 747. However, the 7th Circuit disagreed stating that
the 8th Circuit “did not take into account the importance of the code in
Supreme Court precedent and our nation’s history.” Id. The court pointed
out that “the Code aids those who have reached a certain financial
condition and who need assistance” and thus “ensure[s] the financial
stability of the citizenry.” Id. at 746. Thus, the 7th Circuit held that “there
is a compelling interest in the code.” Id.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Appeals of Dismissals – Standards of Review: Espinoza v. Dimon, 797
F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2015)
The 2nd Circuit addressed what standard of review should be used
for Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23.1 dismissals. Id. at 231. The
Court stated that the approach taken by the 1st and 7th Circuits is to review
Rule 23.1 dismissals de novo, “seeing no reason to treat derivative actions
differently than any other dismissed case.” Id. at 235. The Court noted
however that the D.C. and 9th Circuits are “bound to abuse-of-discretion
review by their precedents,” despite having “questioned the wisdom of
deferential review in this context.” Id. The Court stated that “an appellate
court performs exactly the same task as when reviewing the dismissal of
any other action” when “reviewing the dismissal of a derivative claim.”
Id. The Court then reasoned that although the sufficiency of a complaint’s
demand allegations depends on a fact-sensitive analysis, that is “not
enough to justify deferential review” given that “[m]any other legal
questions turn on the specific context of a given case, and yet they remain
purely legal questions subject to de novo review.” Id. at 236.
Accordingly, the Court sided with the 1st and 7th Circuits, discarding the
deferential standard and holding that “dismissals under Rule 23.1 are
reviewed de novo.” Id.
Judicial Review − § 1252(a)(2)(C): Garcia v. Lynch, 2015 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14469 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2015)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether 8 U.S.C.S. § 1252(a)(2)(C)’s bar
on judicial review applies to the denial of a procedural motion such as a
motion to continue. Id. at *9–10. The court noted that the 7th Circuit and
the 5th Circuit held that the statutory language of § 1252(a)(2)(C) strips
the court of jurisdiction over all other orders that precede the removal
order, whether substantive or procedural in nature. Id. However, the 9th
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Circuit disagreed with the 7th and 5th Circuits and held that
§ 1252(a)(2)(C) does not preclude a review of a denial of relief that is
based not on the “commission or admission of a crime,” but rather on the
alien’s failure to establish his or her eligibility for the relief sought. Id.
The court further held that it retains jurisdiction over the removal order
challenging the denial of relief on the merits instead of basing its review
on a qualifying conviction. Id.
Jurisdiction – Choice of Forum; JPMorgan Chase Bank: N.A. v.
Winget, 602 Fed. Appx. 246 (6th Cir. 2015)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether, in light of the Supreme Court’s
holding in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the bankruptcy court
is the appropriate forum for the delay defense. Id. at 259. In Stern, the
Supreme Court held that an individual’s state law counterclaim was
independent of federal bankruptcy law, and therefore could not be ruled
on in bankruptcy court. Id. at 261. The 6th Circuit acknowledged a circuit
split regarding the applicability of Stern. Id. at 261. The 9th Circuit
previously held that state law fraudulent transfer claims could not be heard
in the bankruptcy court in consideration of Stern. Id. Conversely, the 5th
Circuit held that the bankruptcy court had authority to issue judgment on
a creditor’s claim because the claim was “inextricably intertwined with the
interpretation of a right created by federal bankruptcy law.” Id. This court
agreed with the 5th Circuit, that the holding in Stern does not deprive the
bankruptcy court of its jurisdiction to consider the delay defense because
it is a challenge to the value of bankruptcy assets. Id.
Jurisdiction – Yearsley Immunity: Adkisson v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp.,
Inc., 790 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 2015)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether “Yearsley immunity pose[s] a
jurisdictional bar.” Id. at 646. The court noted that the 4th Circuit has
held that the bar is jurisdictional, reasoning that “Yearsley derivatively
extend[s] sovereign immunity to a private contractor.” Id. at 646. In
contrast, the 5th Circuit held that Yearsley immunity is not jurisdictional,
reasoning that “Yearsley does not discuss sovereign immunity or
otherwise address the court’s power to hear the case” so “concluding
Yearsley is applicable does not deny the court of subject-matter
jurisdiction.” Id. at 647 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 6th
Circuit agreed with the 5th Circuit holding that “Yearsley is not
jurisdictional in nature.” Id. The court reasoned that “Yearsley immunity
is . . . closer in nature to qualified immunity for private individuals under
government contract, which is an issue to be reviewed on the merits rather
than for jurisdiction.” Id.
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Legal standard – District Courts Recalling Jurors After Dismissal:
Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2015)
The 9th Circuit “addressed when a district court abuses its discretion
by recalling jurors after dismissing them,” and what legal standard governs
this analysis. Id. at 1096. The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 7th
Circuits have undertaken case-specific analyses and “have recognized that
in certain limited circumstances, a district court may recall a jury
immediately after dismissal to correct an error in its verdict,” or have
allowed for recall after dismissal in “situations where the jurors have been
released but effectively remained under [the] control of the court.” Id. at
1097. On the other hand, the court noted that the 8th Circuit “eschewed
this case-specific analysis and instead adopted a restrictive bright-line rule
prohibiting recall once the jurors have left the confines of the courtroom.”
Id. at 1098. The 9th Circuit agreed with the majority of the circuits,
finding that the totality of circumstances analysis “strikes a sensible
balance between fairness and economy” if “a proper inquiry into the
circumstances [is made] to ensure jurors were not exposed to prejudicial
influences during the brief period of dismissal.” Id. at 1099. The 9th
Circuit disagreed with the 8th Circuit as to its rigid rule regarding the
courtroom door “[p]recisely because we live in an age of instant electronic
communication,” making the courtroom door an improper place to draw
the line between exposure to outside influences and protection from such
influences. Id. Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded “that in limited
circumstances, a court may recall a jury shortly after it has been dismissed
to correct an error in the verdict, but only after making an appropriate
inquiry to determine that the jurors were not exposed to any outside
influences that would compromise their ability to fairly reconsider the
verdict.” Id. at 1100.
Maritime Law – In Personam Claims: United States v. Jantran, 782
F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2015)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether the Government can bring an in
personam claim against a ship owner or operator under §408 of the Rivers
& Harbors Act (the “Act”). Id. at 1178. While the Act does not expressly
authorize in personam claims, it does authorize the Government to proceed
in rem against any vessel used to violate the Act. Id. at 1179. The 5th
Circuit, relying on the plain language of the Act, found that § 408 does not
authorize in personam actions. Id. at 1182. Dissimilarly, “the [6th] Circuit
allowed an in personam recovery against a ship owner under §408.” The
6th Circuit relied on the reasoning of a previous case that allowed in
personam recovery for a different section of the Act. Id. at 1181. The
10th Circuit agreed with the 5th Circuit’s plain language interpretation of
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the Act and held that “the Government may not bring in personam actions
against vessel owners for violations of § 408 of the Act.” Id. at 1184.
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act – Prisoner Payment of Filing Fees:
Siluk v. Merwin, 783 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2014)
The 3rd Circuit addressed “whether the Prisoner Litigation Reform
Act [28 U.S.C. § 1915] requires recoupment of multiple encumbrances
sequentially or simultaneously.” Id. at 423 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Section 1915(b)(2) of the Act requires a prisoner to make
monthly payments equal to 20 percent of the[ir] preceding month[s]
income.” Id. The 5th, 7th, 10th, and D.C. Circuits, have held that
simultaneous payments should be made when multiple filing fees are
owed, therefore requiring a monthly 20 percent deduction for each
concurrent case that the prisoner owes filing fees for. Id. Contrary, the
2nd and 4th Circuits, have held that sequential payments only require a
single “20-percent deduction from [a prisoner’s] prison account each
month” when the prisoner owes multiple filing fees. Id. The 3rd Circuit
joined the 2nd and 4th Circuits, finding that sequential payments fulfill
Congress’s intent to deter frivolous litigation, while not imposing
significant burdens on a prisoner. Id. at 427.
Removal – Rule of Unanimity: Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City
Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182 (8th Cir. 2015)
The 8th Circuit addressed “whether a representation in a removing
defendant’s notice stating that its codefendants consent can satisfy
§ 1446’s unanimity requirement.” Id at 1187. The court noted that the
4th, 6th, and 9th Circuits have held that “a statement in a defendant’s
timely removal notice [on behalf of his or her] codefendants [consenting
to removal] is sufficient.” Id at 1186. On the other hand, the 5th and 7th
Circuits have suggested that in most situations a defendant cannot give
notice of consent on behalf of another defendant. Id. The 5th Circuit held
that a notice of consent is allowed only by the defendant itself or by
someone with authority to act on behalf of the defendant. Id at 1187. The
court further noted that “[t]he 2011 amendments to § 1446 that codified
the rule of unanimity did not describe the form of or time frame for consent
when multiple defendants are involved.” Id. Thus, the 8th Circuit agreed
with the 4th, 6th, and 9th Circuits holding that a defendant’s timely
removal notice showing consent on behalf of codefendants is sufficient.
Id. at 1188.
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Settlements – Offers of Judgment: Hooks v. Landmark Indus., 797
F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 2015)
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether a complete [Federal] Rule [of
Civil Procedure] 68 offer of judgment moots an individual’s claim.” Id.
at 314. The 5th Circuit noted that the 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 10th, and Federal
Circuits “have all held that a complete Rule 68 offer moots an individual’s
claim” while the 2nd, 9th, and 11th Circuits “have held that an
unaccepted Rule 68 offer cannot moot an individual’s claim.” Id. The 5th
Circuit stated that “Rule 68 considers an unaccepted offer to be
withdrawn” consistent with the “hornbook law that the rejection of an offer
nullifies the offer.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The 5th Circuit
then posited that giving “controlling effect” to an unaccepted Rule 68 offer
would be “flatly inconsistent” with the Rule. Id. Furthermore, the 5th
Circuit reasoned that “[a] contrary ruling would serve to allow
defendants to unilaterally moot named-plaintiffs’ claims in the class action
context–even though the plaintiff, having turned the offer down, would
receive no actual relief.” Id. Therefore, the 5th Circuit joined the 3rd, 4th,
6th, 7th, 10th, and Federal Circuits in holding that “an unaccepted offer of
judgment to a named plaintiff in a class action is a legal nullity, with no
operative effect.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Article III Standing – Class Action Lawsuits: Neale v. Volvo Cars of
N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2015)
The 3rd Circuit addressed the question of what Article III requires of
putative, unnamed class members during a Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 23 motion for class certification, specifically, whether all
class members must possess standing. Id. at 359–60. The 3rd Circuit
noted that the 2nd Circuit has held that while each member of a class need
not submit evidence of personal standing, “no class may be certified that
contains members lacking Article III standing.” Id. at 365. The 3rd
Circuit reasoned that the 8th Circuit has held “a [state] law that permitted
a single injured plaintiff to bring a class action on behalf of a group of
uninjured individuals was “inconsistent with the doctrine of standing . . . .
[stating a] class must be defined in such a way that anyone within it would
have standing.” Id. at 366. The 3rd Circuit also noted that the D.C. Circuit
requires all class members to prove they were in fact injured, but does not
require all to prove standing. Id. The 3rd Circuit disagreed with its sister
circuits, holding that “so long as a named class representative has standing,
a class action presents a valid case or controversy under Article III.” Id.
at 369 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 3rd Circuit reasoned that
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unnamed class members are generally unknown when a class action suit
is filed and are only identified through discovery. Id. at 367.
Fifth Amendment – Equal Protection: Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 792
F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2015)
The 2nd Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, which requires a more difficult standard for
citizenship when a child is born outside of the United States to unwed
parents where only the father is a United States citizen as compared to
when only the mother is a citizen. Id. at 258–59. The 9th Circuit noted
that the “Government has carried its burden of showing an exceedingly
persuasive justification for the statute’s gender-based classification as a
means of addressing the problem of statelessness,” which would not place
the statute in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 273 n.17 (internal
citations omitted). The 2nd Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit because
“the Government has not shown that the problem arose – or was perceived
to arise – more often with citizen mothers than with citizen fathers of
children born out of wedlock abroad.” Id. Thus, the 2nd Circuit held that
a child born outside of the United States to parents out of wedlock where
one is a citizen and the other is not, attains citizenship where the citizen
parent has spent at least one continuous year inside of the United States
prior to the child’s birth. Id. at 272–73.
Second Amendment – Unauthorized Aliens: United States v. MezaRodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether the Second Amendment right to
bear arms protects unauthorized aliens within the borders of the United
States. Id. at 669. The court noted that the 4th, 5th, and 8th Circuits
determined that the Second Amendment does not protect unauthorized
citizens. Id. The 7th Circuit recognized that unauthorized aliens enjoy
other constitutional rights when they have come within the territory of the
United States, and have developed substantial connections with the United
States. Id. at 670. The 7th Circuit disagreed with the 4th, 5th, and 8th
Circuits as the court did not believe that the Second Amendment provides
anything special that excludes unauthorized aliens, while other
constitutional rights do not exclude them. Id. at 671. Thus, the 7th Circuit
concluded that the Second Amendment right to bear arms does not exclude
unauthorized aliens. Id.
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COPYRIGHT LAW
Federal Preemption – Federal Copyright Protection: Spear Mktg. v.
BancorpSouth Bank, 791 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 2015)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether state law claims based on ideas
fixed in tangible media are preempted by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 301(a). Id. at 597. The 5th Circuit specifically examined whether
preemption “extends to all works satisfying the requirements of [the
statute], even those that also contain noncopyrightable material.” Id. at
594. The court noted that the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 7th Circuits determined
that “for the purpose of preemption under § 301(a), ideas fixed in tangible
media fall within the subject matter of copyright.” Id. at 596. Oppositely,
the 11th Circuit held “[i]deas are substantively ineligible for copyright
protection and, therefore, are categorically excluded from the subject
matter of copyright even if expressed in a tangible medium.” Id. (internal
citations omitted). The 5th Circuit held with the majority of circuits
reasoning that it was Congress’ intention for the “Copyright Act to protect
some expressions but not others,” furthermore, Congress “wrote § 301(a)
to ensure that the states did not undo this decision.” Id. Therefore, the 5th
Circuit held that “state law claims based on ideas fixed in tangible media
are preempted by § 301(a). Id. at 597.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) – 29 USC
§ 1113: Fulghum v. Embarq Corp., 785 F.3d 395 (10th Cir. 2015)
The 10th Circuit addressed an ambiguity in a provision of the statute
of limitations for filing for a breach of fiduciary duty where the ambiguous
language at issue stated: “providing that in the case of fraud or
concealment, a civil enforcement action may be commenced not later than
six years after the date of discovery of [the] breach or violation.” Id. at
413 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 10th Circuit noted that the
1st, 3rd, 7th, 8th, 9th and D.C. Circuits determined that the “fraud or
concealment” provision applies only when a fiduciary conceals the alleged
breach. The 10th Circuit also noted that the 2nd Circuit found the provision
applicable when a plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on
fraud, where the defendant had acted to conceal its breach. Id. at 414. The
10th Circuit took a novel position on the issue, concluding that the
provision is an exception to the general statute of limitations, and applies
“when the alleged breach of fiduciary duty involves a claim the defendant
made a false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words of
conduct, by false or misleading allegations or by concealment of that

2015]

Current Circuit Splits

103

which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury or when the
defendant conceals the alleged breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. at 415
(internal quotation marks omitted).
False Claims Act – Scope: United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788
F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2015)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether consequences under the Federal
Claims Act (“FCA”) are triggered for violating Title IV Restrictions after
good faith entry into a program participation agreement (“PPA”). Id. at
711. The 7th Circuit noted that the 9th Circuit determined that a PPA
conditions the initial and continued participation of an eligible institution
upon compliance with Title IV of the Higher Education Act, while the 8th
Circuit found violations of Title IV Restrictions after good faith entry into
Title IV do not trigger FCA liability. Id. at 710. The 7th Circuit agreed
with the 8th Circuit finding good-faith entry into a PPA as the condition
of payment necessary to be eligible under the subsidies program, and
absent evidence of fraud before entry, non-performance after entry into an
agreement for government subsidies does not impose liability under the
FCA. Id. The 7th Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit, because adopting
the 9th Circuit’s position would mean that any conditions in a PPA that
are not met could impose strict liability under the FCA, leading to
untenable results. Id. at 711. Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded FCA
consequences are not triggered where a violation of Title IV Restrictions
occurs after good-faith entry into a PPA. Id. at 710–11.
Retaliatory Discrimination – McDonnell Douglas Legal Standard:
Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015)
The 4th Circuit addressed whether University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) had “any bearing on the
causation prong of the prima facie case” of employment retaliatory
discrimination. Id. at 251. The court noted that the 6th and 11th Circuits
“require evidence of but-for causation in order to establish a prima facie case;”
while the 2nd, 5th, 6th, and 11th Circuits “have held, either expressly or
implicitly, that Nassar did not alter the elements of a prima facie case.”
Id. at 252 n.10. The 4th Circuit disagreed with the 6th and 11th Circuits
because “adopting the contrary rule (and applying the ultimate causation
standard at the prima facie stage) would be tantamount to eliminating the
McDonnell Douglas framework in retaliation cases by restricting the use
of pretext evidence to those plaintiffs who do not need it.” Id. at 251.
Thus, the 4th Circuit concluded “that Nassar does not alter the causation
prong of a prima facie case of retaliation.” Id.
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Statutory Interpretation – Fair Labor Standards Act: Greathouse v.
JHS Sec. Inc., 784 F.3d 105 (2nd Cir. 2015)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether an employee pursuing a claim for
unlawful retaliation must do more than voice an equal pay complaint to a
supervisor to invoke the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”) § 215(a)(3)’s
protections. Id. at 110. The 2nd Circuit noted that the 1st, 4th, 5th, 7th,
8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits have determined that section 215(a)(3)
protects employees from retaliation for their complaints made to
employers, while the 6th Circuit found that complaints to an employer are
covered by section 215(a)(3). Id. The 2nd Circuit agreed with the [1st,
4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th] Circuits, finding that section
215(a)(3) prohibits retaliation against employees who orally complain to
their employers, so long as their complaint is “sufficiently clear and
detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content
and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for
their protection.” Id. at 117.
IMMIGRATION LAW
Illegal Aliens Disputes – Notice Entitlement from the Immigration
Court: Gaye v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2015)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 (INA) or its amended version, the REAL ID Act, entitles the
asylum seeker to notice of what type of corroborating evidence is required
of him. Id. at 529. The 7th Circuit has held that entitling notice “would
create the result that a petitioner must receive additional notice from the
[immigration judge] and then an additional opportunity to provide
corroborative evidence before an adverse ruling, [and thus] necessitate two
hearings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Oppositely, the 9th
Circuit has held “not only that an alien is entitled to such notice, but indeed
that the REAL ID Act unambiguously requires such notice.” Id. The 6th
Circuit agreed with the 7th Circuit holding that, “the INA – either the
version that governed in 2001 or as amended by the REAL ID Act – does
not entitle him to any such notice.” Id. The 6th Circuit reasoned that the
text of the INA “does not suggest that the alien is entitled to notice from
the [immigration judge] as to what evidence the alien must present.” Id.
at 530.
Post-entry Lawful Permanent Resident – Waiver of Inadmissibility:
Medina-Rosales v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2015)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether “Lawful Permanent Residents
(“LPR”) who acquire that status after living in the United States and who
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later are convicted of an aggravated felony are eligible for consideration
for a waiver of inadmissibility under § 1182(h).” Id. at 1143. The 10th
Circuit noted that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 11th Circuits
determined that the language of § 1182(h) precludes eligibility for a waiver
after conviction of an aggravated felony only if the alien received LPR
status at the time the alien lawfully entered the United States, but it does
not apply to an alien who obtained LPR status after having been present in
the United States before acquiring that status. The 8th Circuit disagreed
and found that the language of the statute is ambiguous and therefore that
any alien convicted of an aggravated felony after becoming an LPR,
regardless of when or how that status was acquired, is ineligible for a
waiver of inadmissibility. Id. The 10th Circuit agreed with the majority
of circuits and found the plain meaning of the statute’s language and the
statutory definitions of relevant terms were persuasive. Id. The 10th
Circuit disagreed with the 8th Circuit’s finding that the statutory language
was ambiguous, barring all LPR requests for waivers. Id. Thus, the 10th
Circuit concluded that only persons who obtained LPR status before or
when they entered the United States are barred from seeking a waiver
under § 1182(h). Id. at 1145.
PATENT LAW
Patent Infringement – Collateral Estoppel: United Access Techs., LLC
v. CenturyTel Broadband Servs. LLC, 778 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
The Federal Circuit addressed which Restatement of Judgments
should be adopted regarding collateral estoppel when “the decision of the
first tribunal rests on alternative grounds[.]” Id. at 1333. The First
Restatement of Judgments takes the stance collateral estoppel can apply to
each alternative ground, while The Second Restatement of Judgments
states that no alternative grounds are “entitled to be accorded collateral
estoppel effect.” Id. The Federal Circuit noted the 2nd, 3rd and 9th
Circuits have adopted the First Restatement of Judgments, while the 4th,
5th, 7th, and 10th Circuits have adopted the Second Restatement of
Judgments. Id. The Federal Circuit held that “[i]n a case such as this one,
involving general principles of the law of judgments that do not implicate
questions within this court’s exclusive jurisdiction, [the court] appl[ies]
the law of the regional circuit, which in this case is the [3]rd Circuit.” Id.
at 1330 n.1. Thus, the Federal Circuit adopted the First Restatement of
Judgments as the 3rd Circuit has. Id. at 1333 n.2.
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SECURITIES LAW
Interpretation of “alleging” – Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998: Criterium Capital Funds B.V. v. Tremont
(Berm.), Ltd. (In re Kingate Mgmt. Litig.), 784 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2015)
The 2nd Circuit addressed when the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act’s (SLUSA’s) ambiguous term “alleging” should be deemed
satisfied by a complaint. Id. at 146. The 2nd Circuit noted that the 3rd
and 6th Circuits’ decisions on the issue “may be read to mean that
SLUSA’s ambiguous term ‘alleging’ should be deemed satisfied whenever
a complaint includes allegations of false conduct (of the sort specified in
SLUSA) that is essential to the success of the state law claim, even if that
conduct is alleged to have been done by third persons without the
defendant’s complicity.” Id. The 2nd Circuit disagreed with the 3rd and
6th Circuits since SLUSA’s text, purposes, and history provide no
reasonable justification “for construing SLUSA as barring state-law
claims that do not depend on conduct by the defendant falling within
SLUSA’s specifications of conduct prohibited by the anti-falsity
provisions of the [Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934].” Id. at 149. The 2nd Circuit created a new standard concluding
“that SLUSA’s preclusion applies when the state law claim is predicated
on conduct of the defendant specified in SLUSA’s operative provisions,”
referencing the 1933 and 1934 Acts’ anti-falsity provisions. Id.
NATIVE AMERICAN LAW
National Labor Relations Act – Authority & Jurisdiction: NLRB v.
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir.
2015)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether a federal statute creating a
comprehensive regulatory scheme presumptively applies to Indian tribes.
Id. at 539. The court noted that the 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits determined
that federal statutes creating a comprehensive regulatory scheme do
presumptively apply to Indian tribes, while the 9th Circuit determined that
the presumption is limited by some exceptions. Id. at 547. The 6th Circuit
agreed with the 9th Circuit in finding that a federal statute of general
applicability that is silent on the issue of applicability to Indian tribes will
not apply to them if: “(1) the law touches exclusive rights of selfgovernance in purely intramural matters; (2) the application of the law to
the tribe would abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties; or (3) there
is proof by legislative history or some other means that Congress intended
[the law] not to apply to Indians on their reservations.” Id. at 548, 549–
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50. The court disagreed with the 7th, 8th, and 11th Circuits, finding that
these statutes did not automatically apply to Indian tribes. Id. at 547, 549–
50. Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that the application of federal statutes
to Indian tribes does not always apply. Id. at 549–50.
PUBLIC HEALTH & WELFARE LAW
Social Security – Disability Determinations: Zavalin v. Colvin, 778
F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2015)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether an individual’s functional
capacity may conflict with the ability required of that individual to perform
a Level 3 Reasoning job on the Department of Labor’s General Education
Development scale. Id. at 846. The court noted that the 10th Circuit found
that a conflict does exist between a claimant’s limitation to do “simple and
routine work tasks” and the demands of Level 3 Reasoning, while the 7th
and 8th Circuits found that no such conflict exists. Id. The 9th Circuit
joined the 10th Circuit in holding that an individual’s limitation to perform
simple routine tasks is in conflict with the requirements of Level 3 because
“it may be difficult for a person limited to simple, repetitive tasks to follow
instructions in diagrammatic form as such instructions can be abstract”.
Id. at 847 (internal quotation marks omitted).
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Class Action Suits – Lodestar Method: Levitt v. Southwest Airlines Co.
(In re Southwest Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2015)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether 28 U.S.C. § 1712 allowed a
district court to use the lodestar method to calculate the fee award for class
council. Id. at 707. The court noted that the 9th Circuit determined that
subsection (a) of the statute prohibits the use of the lodestar method for
coupon settlements that do not provide injunctive relief. Id. at *14–15.
The 7th Circuit used methods of statutory interpretation, including the
canon against surplusage, to determine that the words “attributable to”
mean more than just the plain meaning of the words. Id. The 7th Circuit
disagreed with the 9th Circuit as the 9th Circuit took the plain meaning
approach to the words “attributable to,” finding that the words only mean
“caused by.” Id. Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded that the words
“attributable to” in § 1712(a) have more than just a plain meaning, and
therefore a district court could use the lodestar method to calculate
attorney fees to compensate class counsel for the coupon relief obtained
for the class. Id. at 710.
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District Court Discretion – False Claims Act: United States ex rel.
Rigsby v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 794 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2015)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), of the
False Claims Act (FCA), which requires that a “copy of the complaint and
written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information
the person possesses shall be served on the government” and must “remain
under seal until the court orders it served on the defendant[,]”compels a
dismissal of a case if the seal is violated. Id. at 470. The 9th Circuit
requires district courts to “evaluate three factors[,] [known as the Lujan
test,] in determining whether dismissal was warranted:1) the harm to the
government from the violations; 2) the nature of the violations; and 3)
whether the violations were made willfully or in bad faith.” Id. The 2nd
Circuit adopted a similar standard. Id. However, the 6th Circuit has held
that “any violation of the seal requirement, no matter how trivial, requires
dismissal.” Id. at 471. The 5th Circuit reasoned that the purpose of the
FCA was to encourage more private FCA actions and mandating dismissal
for trivial violations of § 3730(b)(2) would be contrary to that purpose. Id.
at 471. Thus, the court joined the 2nd and 9th Circuits in applying the
Lujan test to determine whether dismissal is appropriate when
§ 3730(b)(2) is violated. Id.
Retirement Plans – Defining Normal Retirement Age: Laurent v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 794 F.3d 272 (2d Cir. 2015)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether retirement plan sponsors can
define a plan’s normal retirement age as “five years of service.” Id. at 273.
The court first noted that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) describes an option for the normal retirement age as “the
5th anniversary of the time a plan participant commenced participation in
the plan,” but only after the participant turns 65 years old. Id. at 274. The
7th Circuit said a plan that defined normal retirement age as “five years on
the job” did not violate ERISA because “[t]he Plan’s formula—the
participant’s age when beginning work, plus five years—is an ‘age’” and
because the Plan took the formula from ERISA’s definition. Id. at 238.
The 7th Circuit held that five years on the job is an acceptable, normal
retirement age merely because it is an age. Id. at 283. The 2nd Circuit
disagreed with the 7th Circuit because the 2nd Circuit maintained that a
plan’s normal retirement age must have a “relationship to the age at which
plan participants normally retire because the phrase is used to trigger
certain benefits or adjustments.” Id. at 238. As such, the 2nd Circuit found
that the retirement plan at issue was invalid. Id. at 285.
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CRIMINAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Administrative Proceedings – Admissibility of Evidence: YanezMarquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434 (4th Cir. 2015)
The 4th Circuit addressed whether the ‘qualified immunity’ approach
or the ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach applies “when a violation
of the Fourth Amendment is egregious such that it transgresses notions of
fundamental fairness.” Id. at 453. The court noted that the 9th Circuit
determined that the qualified immunity approach should be applied, while
the 2nd, 3rd, and 8th Circuits found that the totality of circumstances
approach should be applied. Id. The 4th Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 3rd,
and 8th Circuits in finding that the totality of circumstances approach
should be applied. Id. at 459. The court reasoned that the totality of
circumstances approach is a “flexible case-by-case standard, taking into
account a variety of factors. It allows the court to examine all of the facts
it deems relevant to the egregiousness inquiry and focuses on the
unreasonableness of the conduct of the law enforcement officers.” Id. at
460. The 4th Circuit further noted that an “alien’s evidence, in its totality,
must support a basis to suppress the challenged evidence under a finding
of egregiousness, even at the prima facie case stage. Id. The court
reasoned that such evidence cannot be based on intuition or speculation,
especially as it relates to the intent of law enforcement officers. Id. The
4th Circuit noted that suppression hearings should be the exception, not
the rule in removal proceedings, so the alien’s evidentiary burden, even at
the prima facie case stage, is high.” Id. at 461 (internal citations omitted).
The 4th Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit as the qualified immunity
approach “requires a suppression hearing any time an alien alleges that the
law enforcement officers acted in bad faith . . . [which] sets the
evidentiary proffer bar too low.” Id. at 459. Thus, the 4th Circuit held
that the totality of the circumstances approach applies when assessing the
egregiousness of a Fourth Amendment violation. Id.
Criminal Sentencing – Appellate Review: United States v. Doe, 2015
U.S. App. LEXIS 15578 (3d Cir. Sept. 2, 2015)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether a Begay error, the
mischaracterization of a crime or offense that results in a sentence
enhancement, is debatably constitutional and therefore cognizable for
collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Id. at *24. The 4th Circuit
stated that “it [was] at least debatable that [the] erroneous application of
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the career offender enhancement deprives [a defendant] of his liberty in
violation of his due process rights.” Id. at *23. The 8th Circuit, however,
held that a “Begay claim, far from being constitutional, was not even
cognizable in a § 2255 case.” Id. The 3rd Circuit agreed with the 4th
Circuit, and found the error at least debatably constitutional. The court
held “that the claim is cognizable, at least in cases arising under the
mandatory Guidelines.” Id. at *57.
Deportation – Sentencing Enhancements: United States v. Kosmes,
792 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2015)
The 8th Circuit addressed the mens rea standard to consider a crime
“violent” concerning the 16-level sentencing enhancement of 18 U.S.C.
Appx. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Id. at 974. The court noted that the 10th
Circuit required purpose or intent, while the 3rd, 4th and 5th Circuits
required recklessness. Id. at 976. The 8th Circuit agreed with the 3rd, 4th
and 5th Circuits in finding that the 4th Circuit precedent was based on the
Model Penal Code, which provides the “best generic federal definition.”
Id. at 977. Additionally, the 8th Circuit noted that the 10th Circuit has
“questioned its holding . . . . [I]t is possible that at least some crimes with
a recklessness element might be crimes of violence.” Id. at 978 n.6
(internal citations omitted). Thus, the 8th Circuit concluded that
recklessness constitutes “violent crime” allowing for a 16-level sentencing
enhancement. Id. at 978.
Extradition – Speedy Trial Clause: Martinez v. United States, 793 F.3d
533 (6th Cir. 2015)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether a treaty with Mexico concerning
extradition is subject to the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Id. at 544. The Court noted that the
11th Circuit determined that the “lapse of time” provision in the treaty did
not invoke protection under the Speedy Trial Clause. Id. at 545. The Court
disagreed with the 11th Circuit, relying on precedent and statutory
interpretation, which encourages a more liberal interpretation of the treaty
when provisions or terms are ambiguous. Id. at 547. Thus, the 6th Circuit
concluded that the treaty allows a petitioner to invoke the Sixth
Amendment if a certain amount of time has passed between a crime
committed and the extradition request. Id. at 548.
Remedies – Calculation of Damages: United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d
1101 (9th Cir. 2015)
The 9th Circuit considered whether Application Note 3(F)(v) of the
United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual should be

2015]

Current Circuit Splits

111

applied to the use of fraud to secure minority-business certifications. Id.
at 1110. The 7th Circuit “has held that the use of fraud to secure minoritybusiness certifications fits . . . within the scheme considered by
Application Note 3(F)(v)” of the United States Sentencing Commission
Guidelines Manual. Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Application Note
3(F)(v) provides that where regulatory approval by a government agency
is obtained by fraud, the loss shall include the amount paid for the
property, services, or goods transferred, rendered, or misrepresented, with
no credit provided for the value of those items or services.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The 9th Circuit disagreed with the 7th Circuit’s
decision to apply the rule reasoning that “the rule of lenity counsels against
an expansive interpretation of the application note, particularly where, as
discussed below, another application note is a closer fit to these
circumstances.” Id.
Sentencing – Adjustments and Enhancements: United States v.
Cramer, 777 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 2015)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether “[a]pplication Note 4 to [U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines] section 2G1.3 [is] plainly inconsistent with [U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G.1.3(b)(3)(B)] and therefore
inapplicable to that subsection.” Id. at 600. The court noted that the 4th
and 5th Circuits have held that the Application Note relates only to the
minor-inducement subsection of the provision, and Application Note 4
was inconsistent with § 2G.1.3(b)(3)(B), while the 7th Circuit found that
the enhancement did not apply in spite of its plain language. Id. at 604,
606. The 2nd Circuit agreed with the 4th and 5th Circuits that Application
Note 4 is plainly inconsistent with § 2G.1.3(b)(3)(B). Id. at 606. The court
reasoned that the language of § 2G.1.3(b)(3)(B) is clear, and there is “no
indication that the drafters of the Guidelines intended to limit this plain
language through Application Note 4.” Id. Thus, the 2nd Circuit
concluded “Application Note 4 does not preclude an enhancement
under Guidelines section 2G1.3(b)(3)(B) when a defendant solicits third
parties to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with a minor, even if neither
the minor nor someone who exercises custody, care, or supervisory control
over the minor is involved directly in the communication.” Id. at 607.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Choice of Law – U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 7B1.1(a)(1)(A)(i): United States v. Willis, 795 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2015)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether a court should use the applicable
federal, state, or local offense or the defendant’s conduct to determine
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whether an uncharged offense constitutes a federal crime of violence. Id.
at 993. The 2nd Circuit previously found that a determining what
constitutes a crime of violence requires a court to compare the defendant’s
actual conduct to the federal definition of the crime. Id. The 3rd Circuit
has held that “the categorical approach is necessarily not applicable in the
revocation context.” Id. at 993 n.5. The 9th Circuit disagreed with the
2nd and 3rd Circuits; instead, the 9th Circuit concluded that a court must
identify the particular crime for which the defendant was responsible, and
determine whether that crime, rather than the defendant’s conduct,
contains an element of force to determine if the crime was a crime of
violence. Id. at 993.
Fraud – Defining ‘Means of Identification’ under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A:
United States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2015)
The 11th Circuit addressed “whether the use of someone’s name and
forged signature on a United States Treasury check sufficiently identifies
a specific individual to qualify as a ‘means of identification’ under 18
U.S.C. §1028A.” Id. at 1310. The court noted that the 9th Circuit
determined that “a forged signature constitutes the use of that person’s
name and thus qualifies as a ‘means of identification’ under the statute[,]”
while the 4th Circuit found that “a bare name alone was not sufficient to
identify the specific individual as required under the statute[.]” Id. The
11th Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit, finding that the plain language of
the statute supports its position. Id. at 1310. The statute plainly defines
‘means of identification’ as “any name or number that may be used, alone
or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific
individual.” Id. at 1311. The 11th Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit’s
position that “[b]y using the word any to qualify the term ‘name,’ the
statute reflects Congress’s intention to construct an expansive definition
that includes a signature.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
the 11th Circuit concluded that the use of names and forged signatures on
refund checks, standing alone, qualifies as a means of identification under
18 U.S.C. §1028A. Id.
Mens Rea – Bank Fraud Act: United States v. Shaw, 781 F.3d 1130
(9th Cir. 2015)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether § 1344(1) of the Bank Fraud Act
requires specific intent to defraud the bank itself. Id. at 1131. The court
noted that the 2nd Circuit determined that the statute requires intent to
specifically defraud the bank, while the 9th Circuit found that the statute
only requires intent to harm any entity, regardless if the harm occurs to a
specific person or a bank. Id. at 1136. The court disagreed with the 2nd

2015]

Current Circuit Splits

113

Circuit, reasoning that requiring specific intent would pose difficulty in
prosecuting such crimes and because such an interpretation of the statute
does not align with Congress’ legislative intent. Id. Thus, the 9th Circuit
concluded that the only intent required to violate the Bank Fraud Act is an
intent to harm any entity. Id.
Natural Resources – Fish and Wildlife Protection: United States v.
Hughes, 795 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2015)
The 8th Circuit addressed whether or not a price of guide services in
excess of $350 conclusively establishes a felony violation of the Lacey
Act. Id. at *8. The court noted that the 5th and 9th Circuits determined
that evidence of the price guide services is relevant to the market value of
the wildlife. Id. at *9–11. The 8th Circuit disagreed with the 5th, 9th, and
10th Circuits “[t]o the extent that [those circuits] hold that a price of guide
services in excess of $350 conclusively establishes a felony violation.” Id.
at *11. The 8th Circuit stated that: “we believe that, in determining the
market value of wildlife, the jury may consider evidence of the price of
guide services.” Id. The court further noted that it agrees “with the [5th]
and [9th] Circuits that evidence of the price of guide services is relevant
to the market value of the wildlife but “simply do not agree that it is
always the same as the market value of the wildlife (or, for that matter,
that it is always the best indication of the value of the game.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 8th Circuit held that the jury may
consider evidence of the price of guide services in determining the market
value of wildlife. Id.
Standards of Review−Plain and Clear Error Review: United States v.
Barela, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14501 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 2015)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether a condition imposed on an
individual’s supervised release that prohibited viewing, possessing,
depicting, or describing sexually explicit conduct or pornography involved
a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary, and thereby violated the
First Amendment. Id. at *2. The 1st, 7th and 9th Circuits held that the
similar ban on sexually stimulating material was plain error. Id. at *18.
On the other hand, the 6th and 8th Circuits held that there was no error in
imposing a condition banning pornography and erotica. Id. Here, the 10th
Circuit found the case at bar was more consistent with the 6th and 8th
Circuit cases. Id. at *18–19. Thus, the court held there is no demonstrative
clear and obvious error because of the defendant’s voracious history of
pornography viewing. Id. at *19.

